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Groves and others have shown that truthful answers concerning preferences for public goods 
can be elicited as dominant strategies if appropriate tax-subsidies rules are applied. This paper 
studies the statistical properties of the total revenues generated by one of the mechanisms with 
this desirable dominant strategy property. For particular specifications, it is shown that the 
expected total revenues increase like 4N. Further, if these revenues are rebated equally to the 
individuals in the model, then, although the dominant strategy property no longer obtains, the 
optimal responses converge to the truth in large economies. As a result, it can be shown that 
the mechanism with rebates will make the Pareto optimal decision with arbitrarily high 
probability, provided that the willingness to pay distribution is assumed to be symmetric. 
1. Introduction 
Even though the problem of manipulating preferences occurs in private goods 
economies [see Hurwicz (1972), Guesnerie and Laffont (1975)], it is fair to say 
on the basis of Roberts and Postlewaite (1976), that in situations with a large 
number of participants, the problem is progressively less severe. On the contrary, 
with public goods, the failure of decentralized allocation mechanisms requires 
the creation of decision mechanisms which face the possibility of manipulation 
with increasing acuteness as the number of agents increases [see Hurwicz (197.5), 
Ledyard and Roberts (1974)]. Since Wicksell’s pioneering work (1896), this 
‘free-rider’ problem has been emphasized by many authors [Samuelson (1954), 
Musgrave (1959)] and remains a fundamental issue of public economics. Indeed, 
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that it is impossible to 
design Pareto optimal nondictatorial social decision rules when no restrictions 
are placed on individuals’ announced preferences. 
However, as in the case of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, one may obtain 
less pessimistic outcomes in more specialized contexts. Further, these results 
assume that individuals have perfect information about the workings of these 
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mechanisms and the actions of others, as well as infinite computational ability. 
New results may stem from the imposition of meaningful and reasonable 
constraints on agents’ ability to predict the consequences their actions will have 
on the course of the public decision-making process. 
In the case of the determination of the level of provision of public goods and 
monetary transfers among individuals, Groves (1973, 1974), Groves and Loeb 
(1975), assuming transferable utility and preferences that are separable in income 
and the public goods, found a class of mechanisms with the properties that 
stating one’s true preferences is a dominant strategy for each individual and that 
the outcome is Pareto optimal. In Green and Laffont (1975b) we have shown 
that these mechanisms are the only ones with these characteristics. A principle 
drawback of these models is that they do not automatically balance the govern- 
ment budget. The sum of monetary transfers over the set of individuals is zero 
only in rare, fortuitious, cases. Presumably these deficits or surpluses are balanced 
by taxation schemes outside this decision-making mechanism. These transfers 
are not foreseen by the participants when they formulate their original actions. 
In view of these limitations, Groves and Ledyard (1975) have constructed a 
family of mechanisms which, in presence of public goods, yield Pareto optimal 
outcomes in a truly general equilibrium framework without the assumption of 
transferable utility. To reach this goal they must, by virtue of the characteriza- 
tion theorem of Green-Laffont (1975b), weaken the result of Groves (1973) in 
terms of manipulation. The truthful revelation of marginal willingness to pay 
for public goods occurs at a Nash equilibrium; in other words they must give 
up the attractive dominant-strategy property which removes all the problems 
of a noncooperative game theoretic nature. Also, the necessity of a tatonnement 
procedure to reach an equilibrium suggests that the deepest form of manipulation 
is concerned with manipulation along the dynamic process leading to the 
equilibrium. This idea is pursued in Hurwicz (1975). In any case, the results 
obtained by Groves and Ledyard (1975) should be considered as a crucial 
breakthrough since they provide the first general equilibrium treatment of the 
free-rider problem. However, we believe that it is also important to extend our 
knowledge of the original Groves mechanisms (1973) which offer considerable 
potentialities of applications because of the dominant strategy property [see 
Green and Laffont (1974, 1975a)]. In this paper we present results concerned 
with the extent to which the application of these mechanisms might cause 
problems of a general equilibrium nature. 
More specifically, we focus attention on one specific mechanism of the 
Groves class which has the following desirable features. Although the sum of 
transfer payments among individuals is not exactly zero, if we conceive of 
individual willingnesses-to-pay as being successive independent samples from a 
fixed population, it can be shown that the expected per capita net transfer pay- 
ments go to zero in large economies. The precise result is that the expected 
transfers grow only at the rate of the square root of the population size. 
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The implication of this result is that the failure of this mechanism to be self- 
contained and truly general equilibrium in nature will not be a serious flaw in 
a large numbers context. If we take the approach of Green and Laffont (1974) 
and take a random sample of the population, use the mechanism on them, and 
make a decision for the entire group on the basis of this outcome, the expected 
net transfer payments received by the unsampled individuals becomes small if 
the sampled group grows at the same rate as the population size or more slowly. 
If a small sample is taken, this asymptotic feasibility result is even stronger. 
On the other hand, one could think of modifying the mechanism by distributing 
any net transfers equally across the entire population, after having elicited the 
response of all individuals. This modification would, according to Green and 
Laffont (1975a), destroy the dominant strategy property since the individuals 
would foresee the potential influence of their professed willingness-to-pay 
on their share of the aggregate net transfers, as well as on the decision making 
process of the original mechanism. However, if we endow individuals with the 
same beliefs concerning the distribution of tastes in the population, it can be 
shown that the optimal statement for any individual converges to the truth in 
large numbers situations. Thus, the bias induced in the decision-making process 
by redistributing the results of the mechanism in this way is of vanishing impor- 
tance. On either interpretation, therefore, this paper shows that the desirable 
dominant strategy property can be essentially preserved in large economies by 
choosing a particular mechanism of the Groves class. Finally we show that this 
property of asymptotic dominance of the truthful response implies that the 
mechanism will give rise to the Pareto optimal decision with arbitrarily high 
probability as the number of agents increases. 
2. The mechanism 
We consider an economy with N agents in which a decision is to be made 
concerning a single well-defined public project. It is assumed, for simplicity, 
that the project is costless to undertake. The preferences of a typical individual, 
i, are describable by a utility function which depends on the public decision 
concerning the project and any monetary transfers, positive or negative, that he 
might receive, in the following simple way, 
Ui = Ui+tl, if the project is accepted, 
Ui = ti, if the project is rejected, 
where ti is the transfer received by individual i and Vi is a constant which we 
refer to as his willingness-to-pay. 
The willingnesses-to-pay, though known by the individuals, are unknown to the 
planner, or government. The planner would like to undertake the project if 
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and only if C oi 2 0. This is equivalent to maximizing a social welfare function 
with equal weights for all individuals. 
The goal of this line of inquiry is to explore the possibility of establishing 
rules for making transfers among individuals, contingent on their professed 
willingnesses-to-pay, in such a way as to make telling the truth about these 
parameters in the private interest of each individual. 
More formally, we can let the decision space be (0, 1) - ‘0’ for rejection and 
‘1’ for acceptance. The outcome space is then (0, 1) x RN, where (d, t) is the 
typical element. The ith component of t, ti, is the transfer received by the ith 
individual. 
A mechanism is a mapping, f, from RN to (0, 1) x RN. The domain, RN, is the 
product of the strategy spaces of the individuals, that is, an individual can profess 
to have a willingness-to-pay equal to any real number. Let w = (WI, . . ., wN) 
be a typical element of the domain. LetfJw) be the decision taken when w is the 
joint strategy, that is, it is the projection off(w) into (0, l}; and letfi(w) be the 
transfer that the mechanism assigns to the ith individual. 
In a straightforward way, we can write the utility function as it depends on the 
mechanism and the strategies of all individuals as 
Ui(f(“‘)) = fiCw) + vi 3 iffdw) = 19 
ul(f(w)> =_fitw> 9 iff,(w) = 0. 
If T-i E RN-’ and Ti E R, let (t_i, ri) represent the vector in RN obtained by 
interjecting ri in the ith component. That is, 
and 
We shall say that a mechanism is strongly individually incentive compatible 
(s.i.i.c.) if 
ui(.f(w-i> vi>) 2 zci(f(w-i, will 
for all w_ i E RN-’ and wi E R. In such mechanisms, the truth, Vi, is a dominant 
strategy, for the ith individual. 
A mechanism is said to be successful if it is s.i.i.c. and if 
fo(w) = 0 iff C vi < 0. 
In Green and Laffont (1975a) it is shown that the only successful mechanisms 
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are of the form proposed by Groves (1973) and Groves and Loeb (1973). That is, 
fe(W) = 0 iff C Wi < 0, 
and 
fi(W) = (C W_i+hi(W_i)), if C Wi 1 0, 
fi(W) = hi(W-i)9 ifCwi < 0, 
for some set of arbitrary functions hi:RN-’ -+ R, i = 1, . . ., N, where c w-i = 
Cj+ iwj* 
These mechanisms are highly attractive since they are immune to any non- 
cooperative manipulation, and they achieve optimal allocations of resources 
but they still suffer from several drawbacks. One is the possibility of manipula- 
tion by groups of individuals - a difficult potential problem which we will not 
treat herein. A second defect is that the sum of the transfer payments is not zero. 
One can quite easily show that no matter what set of functions {hi}, i = 1, . . ., N, 
is chosen, the resulting sum of transfer payments will not be constant over 
alternative possible values of vi, i = 1,. . ., N. This problem, which in related 
literature [see Hurwicz (1972) and references therein] is called ‘feasibility’, is 
certainly a serious one. It means that the mechanism does not really define an 
allocation of resources at all since it does not specify how any surplus collected 
should be redistributed nor how any deficit should be financed. 
For example, if we concentrate on the particular mechanism defined by hi = 0, 
i= 1,. . . , iV, then, when the project is accepted, the sum of all transfers received is 
(N- 1)x wi. That is, the total transfer payment is (N- 1) times the social value of 
the project itself. On practical grounds, this is quite clearly too much of a 
distortion. One might think of subtracting a suitably large constant function h, 
but this would result in heavy taxes in the case of rejection and would be similarly 
unacceptable. 
We use, therefore, the following mechanism, which will be referred to as the 
pivotal mechanism for reasons that will be made apparent below. The function 
h is defined by 
hi(w_i) = -C W-i, if 1 W-i 2 0, 
hi(W_i) = 0, ifEW_i < 0. 
The transfer function is accordingly: 
f&W) = 0, if 1 Wi 2 0 and c w_~ 2 0, 
Y+Cw) = C w-i, ifCWi 2 Oandxw_i < 0, 
fi(w) = -C w-i9 ifCWi < Oandzw_i 2 0, 
fi(W) = O, ifxw, < Oandxw_i < 0. 
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Several features of this mechanism should be mentioned. First, it taxes 
individuals but never subsidizes them. The individuals who pay the tax are those 
whose stated willingnesses-to-pay are such as to change the sign of the aggregate 
-these individuals are pivotal in the decision, or pivots. Their payment is just 
the amount by which the decision that their vote causes is damaging to the 
remainder of the agents. This mechanism is the public goods analogue of the bid- 
ding process first proposed by Vickrey (1961). Second, the nature of these pay- 
ments is such that no individual would prefer not to participate in the mechanism, 
allowing the others to make the decision instead. This follows because the 
maximum tax that could be enforced upon him is at most the amount that 
changing the social decision would be worth to him. Moreover it is clear that 
any attempt to raise additional revenues through the mechanism by making 
hi lower at any value of w_ i would run the risk of causing some agents to refuse 
to participate in the process. If they could not be compelled to do so, as might 
be the case if a sampling approach were taken, this would bias the results of the 
mechanism and would render it unsuccessful. Third, and finally, the aggregate 
tax collection is bounded at a much lower level than for other mechanisms. It is 
easy to show that the upper bound on the sum of payments by pivotal individuals 
is one half the sum of the absolute value of the stated willingnesses-to-pay. This 
can be attained only when c wi is exactly zero, so that the project is accepted 
according to our sign convention, and all individuals whose willingness-to-pay 
is positive have stated identical values of that parameter. This bound is not 
always lower than the value of (N- 1)x wi as can be seen, in particular, in the 
case in which the bound is achieved as mentioned above. It is therefore incorrect 
to claim that the pivotal mechanism is ‘cheaper’ or ‘closer-to-being feasible’ 
than h = 0, or any other particular mechanism. However, it can be shown that 
the pivotal mechanism generates, in a statistical sense, a much lower value of 
total payments. 
3. Expected payments by pivotal individuals 
In light of the comments made above, we assume that the actual willingnesses- 
to-pay in the population of N individuals can be viewed as having arisen from 
repeated independent sampling from a fixed distribution. The spirit of this 
assumption is that this mechanism will be used to evaluate many potential 
public projects whose characteristics are similar, and the decision-making 
agency, or government, is interested in minimizing the extent of the necessary 
transfer payments in the long run. We therefore consider the expected level of 
payments made by the pivotal individuals, since only these individuals are taxed 
in the mechanism under consideration. By symmetry, it suffices to consider a 
single agent and compute his expected tax payments. 
Let F(e) be the distribution of the willingness-to-pay of a single agent, a. Let 
FN_l( *) be the distribution of the sum of N- 1 such independent random 
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variables, which we denote by x. The agent will be pivotal under the mechanism 
described in section 2, if 1x1 < Iv1 and either 
v<o<x 
or 
xco<v. 
Whenever he is pivotal his payment is 1x1. 
Therefore the expected total taxes collected from all the agents are 
EN = NJ?,” dF(v) J (XI IXI<IVI and xu<o+I @,v-rW. (1) 
In the case in which F(a) is a unimodal distribution with mean and mode at 
zero and finite variance o’, it can be shown1 that E,/dN converges to o/22/(2n), 
and in particular that the per capita expected payment is going to zero. The 
convergence of this expression in the general mean zero case is an open question. 
Below, assuming that the distribution F(a) is normal with mean zero, we give 
an explicit calculation of EN and its limiting properties. 
EN = 2NJ!,dF(v)J,“xdF,_,(x) 
= nd(i_l) Jo-, exp[-v2/2] dv &“x exp[-x2/2(N-l)] dx 
= -WW-1) 
n 
J!! m exp[ - v2/2] dv [exp[ - v2/2(N- I)] - l] 
= & UWN- 1) - W- WNI . 
It follows that 
VTW % = 1/(N-I)-(N-l) y 
= +N (1/V- W-W- 1)) 
’ 5 TN (N-(N- 1)) = d+ 
See Green and Laffont (1976). In that paper, a proof that no Groves mechanism can have in 
general abalanced budget is also given. 
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If F had a nonzero mean, ,u, then E,/N would converge to zero even more 
rapidly than 1/1/N. We demonstrate this in the next section via a simulation 
when F is normal with mean p # 0. The convergence is exponential. Intuitively 
the reason is that x is centered around (N- 1)~ which is very large when N is 
large. It is therefore extremely unlikely that v would dominate x in absolute 
value and have the opposite sign. A proof of this result under the assumption that 
NOlfN_l(~) converges uniformly to zero as N goes to infinity, where &-r(e) is 
the density of FN_l, is given in Green and Laffont (1976). 
4. Simulations 
The expressions obtained in section 3 were evaluated using well-known 
methods of numerical analysis. In fig. 1 we show the values of EN(p) for 1~1 = 
0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. It is clear that EN(*) converges pointwise as p --f 0, and that each 
EN(p) achieves a maximum beyond which it decreases rapidly as N + co. For 
each EN(O), however, the computations confirm the fact that it increases on the 
order of N’j2 as N + co. Results for selected larger values of N and IpI are 
gathered in table 1. 
As a practical matter, the mean zero cases, in which our results are weakest, 
are of central importance. When the planner is certain about the population 
mean and believes it to be nonzero, the social decision in a large economy is 
almost surely determined in advance of the application of any mechanism. We 
therefore concentrate on the zero mean case throughout our further analysis in 
section 5. 
5. Asymptotic dominance 
The interpretation of the asymptotic feasibility results given above follows 
the spirit of the approximation results found in a variety of contexts in Walrasian 
general equilibrium theory. That is, if an imbalance becomes negligible on a per 
capita basis in a large economy, then the system is approximately in equilibrium. 
All measurements, both physical and economic, being imprecise, we can there- 
fore regard the system as being in a true, exact, equilibrium. 
In the current model, that is the case. The taxes collected are negligible on a 
per capita basis and the dominant strategy property insures that truthful re- 
sponses are always being given. However, it is not clear that we should be 
completely satisfied with such an approximation in this context. Unlike the case 
of individuals demanding private goods at prices which depart slightly from the 
true equilibrium, in the present model the incentive to behave optimally grows 
progressively weaker with the size of the economy. This raises the following 
query. Suppose that the taxes collected were rebated equally to all individuals. 
Would individuals still have the incentive to tell the truth? 
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In order to provide a meaningful answer to this question we must specify 
the expectations each individual holds concerning the distribution of stated 
willingnesses-to-pay as expressed by the other people. The rebates, which 
insure the exact feasibility of the process, destroy the dominant strategy property. 
To keep the analysis parallel to that of the previous sections, we assume that each 
of the individuals in the society believes that all of the others are drawn indepen- 
dently from a normal population with zero mean. We will then calculate his 
optimal stated willingness-to-pay and show that this approaches the truth as 
the economy grows. 
It should be pointed out that this is a much stronger result than that obtained 
in the earlier sections. It is not enough that per capita expected rebates are going 
to zero. The potential regret for distorting one’s answer is also decreasing since 
it is progressively less likely that each individual is pivotal. One must weigh the 
expected change in the rebate to be received against this regret, and must show 
that the latter is the stronger effect. As both the rebate and the regret are ap- 
proaching zero on the order of N-l”, a more refined analysis is necessary before 
the optimum response can be determined. 
Let us first compute the expected utility of any response, w, given that decisions 
will be taken and taxes will be computed using the pivotal mechanism, and that 
equal rebates will then be made to all individuals. 
For simplicity, we will concentrate on the case in which w 2 0, the case of 
w < 0 being symmetric. Let there be N+ 1 individuals in all; therefore from 
the viewpoint of any one of them there are N others. The sum of their responses 
is denoted x, and is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and 
variance N (without loss of generality). Let FN(x) be the distribution function 
of this random variable. Then the expected utility derived from the project itself 
is 
21 J”, d&(x). (2) 
Since l/(N+ 1) of one’s own taxes are rebated, the expected payments net of 
this rebate are 
because the individual is pivotal (when w > 0) if and only if --w c x < 0. 
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Finally, we have to compute the expected rebates from the N other pivota\ 
payments. The sum of the expected payments by these individuals, if they are 
pivotal in the affirmative, is 
NJ:“, dFN_r(x) J”,_, (w+x) dF(Z), (4) 
where FN._r(x) is the distribution of the sum of N- 1 random variables, each of 
which is distributed normally with zero mean and unit variance - F(Z) being the 
distribution of the willingness to pay of such a typical potentially pivotal 
individual. From the individual’s point of view, his statement, W, is known, and 
only the other N are random. This explains the asymmetry of this expression 
about zero and the difference between it andthose of section3. Similarly,expected 
total payments by pivotal individuals who have defeated the public project are 
-NJ_“, dFN_r(x) JI”,-“(w+x) dF(Z). (5) 
Therefore, since the individual is entitled to l/(N+ 1) of these as a subsidy, 
his expected utility from this source is 
& [J”, dFN_r(x) JI”,-” (w+x) dF(z) 
-JI”, dFN_l(x)J-“W_X (w+x> dF(Z)] (6) 
The sum of (2) and (6) minus (3) is the expected utility of the response w > 0. 
It is easy to see that because l/(N+ 1) of one’s own taxes are rebated, the 
optimal response considering only (2)- (3) is [(N+ 1)/A+, . This is true indepen- 
dently of one’s beliefs about the distribution of responses by the others. However, 
considering the fact that one’s share in the rebates of others’ pivotal payments 
is partially determined by one’s own statement, the optimal answer may be 
somewhat modified. 
Consider the case of three individuals with v’s equal to 1, -4, and 2 respec- 
tively. The first individual is not a pivot. He receives a subsidy of 1 which is his 
share of the second individual’s pivotal payment. By saying 14, however, he 
can increase his subsidy to l&; similarly, any statement less than 2 will cause 
the second individual to be pivotal by a larger amount, and hence will increase 
his payment. However, if he follows this course, but is ignorant of the actual 
statements to be made by the others, then he may be hurt by this exaggeration. 
For example, if the third individual would say 3 instead of 2, then by saying 
1% he has made himself pivotal and must pay a tax which would have been 
avoided by a truthful response. The larger the variability of the sum of everyone 
else’s answers, the more risky it becomes to try and increase one’s share in total 
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taxes collected by distorting one’s response. For uncertain beliefs about the 
others’ tastes that are symmetric around zero, it can be shown that this considera- 
tion induces a response closer to zero than [(N+ l)/N]u,. 
We will now argue that w > 0 is the relevant case to consider when v > 0 and 
by symmetry the optimum will be characterized by w < 0 when v < 0. The 
original mechanism, which has a payoff function of ((2)- (3)) x [(N+ 1)/N] is 
optimized at w = v by the dominant strategy property. The additional term, 
-- 
Nil J- 
’ w x dF,(x) , 
which enters into (3), represents the expected rebate on one’s own pivotal 
payments. It is clearly a symmetric function around zero which achieves its 
minimum there and is monotone on either side of this point. Therefore the 
maximum of (2) and (3) must be at a point v* which has the same sign as v 
and is greater in absolute value. 
The value of the expression (6) on the other hand is maximized at zero and 
is a symmetric function which is monotone decreasing on its positive branch 
and increasing on its negative branch. Therefore the maximal expected utility 
will be attained between v* and zero. Therefore, when v > 0, the relevant 
maximand is the expected utility indicated above. Furthermore, the remarks 
above indicate that the maximum will be attained on the interior of the interval 
[0, v*], and will be characterized by a zero of the derivative at that point. 
This derivative can be calculated to be 
vfN(-W) - & wfN(-4 
+ N+ [j”, dF”-‘(x)[j:;--” dF(Z)-(w+x)f(-w-x)]] 
- N+l [J-“, dFN-‘(x) [(w+x)f(-w-x)+ I”,_, dF(Z)ll, (8) 
that is, 
N 
VfN(-W) - - 
N+l 
wf”(-W) + gl J”, dFN-‘(x) JI”,-” dF(Z) 
- & JI”, dFN-‘(x) - Y&1 j”, dP-‘(x)(w+x)f(-w-x), 
(9) 
where f N and f are the densities of the distributions FN and F respectively. 
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We now assume normally distributed individual willingness-to-pay, with zero 
mean and unit variance.2 In this case, let [N/(N+ l)]g,(w) denote the last term 
of (9). Then 
but 
x exp[-(w+x)2/2] d-x, 
X2 
NTl+(w+x)2 = N% (x+y wy+$ 
so that 
1 
gh44 = 2/(2n(N_ l))1/(2n) exP[- ~*/~I 
Clearly, 
l/(N)gN(w) converges to zero uniformly in [0, a*]. v-9 
Denote now the sum of the third and fourth terms of (9) by [N/(N+ l)]&(w). 
Then 
444 
1 m 
= - s 2/(2n(N_ 1))4(271) _co expFx2/2(N- 01 
1 
x exp[--w2/2Nl dX+dc2ncN_ Ijj eM--w2/W-- 1)l 
= - &) exp[-w2/2N]+ 
1 
1/(2n(N_ l))exp[- w2/2(N- 1). 
2This is generalized in Green and Laffont (1976) to unimodal symmetric distributions such 
that q(N)fN( .) converges uniformly to a constant as N + 00. 
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It is clear that Z/(N)&(w) converges uniformly to zero in [0, u*]. Since 
AN(O) = _t -$ = 0, it follows that 
d(N)&(w) converges uniformly to zero in [0, u*]. (11) 
Let w, be the maximum point of the expected utility (2)-(3)+(6). Then, 
setting the derivative (9) equal to zero, we get 
N 
- N+1 &!NcwN) = ’ ’ 
Multiplying this equation by 4N and applying (10) and (11) we get that WN 
converges to v, as was to be shown. 
6. Asymptotic successfulness 
The primary goal of these mechanisms is to induce collective decisions that 
are Pareto optimal. Closing the system through a rebate of the pivotal payments 
collected induces a bias in individual responses that is small if the individual 
perceives himself to be only one among a large number of agents in the system. 
This does not guarantee that the social decision is ‘approximately optimal.’ 
Indeed, since we view individuals having stochastically generated tastes, the 
approximate optimality of such closed mechanisms, if it can be proved to hold 
at all, must be a statistical statement. 
We will say that a mechanism is asymptotically successful if for large enoug:r 
economies it gives rise to the correct decision regarding acceptance or rejection of 
the project with arbitrarily high probability. If the rebate mechanism analyzed 
above did not have this property, the fact that individuals can be induced to give 
asymptotically correct answers would be of little relevance. A priori it seems 
possible that if in order to induce answers of a given degree of accuracy we need 
a very large number of agents, then the errors made by these agents in responding 
to the mechanism might accumulate in such a way as to distort the aggregate. 
In this section we assume that the Vi are independently and identically distri- 
buted with zero mean. Further, it is supposed that the distribution through 
which they are generated is symmetric about zero and has a densityf(*). 
In light of the preceding section, we know that the optimal response, wN(‘), 
of an agent believing that the population is of size N satisfies; 
(a) wN( *) is an integrable function; 
(b) wN(v) approaches uas N goes to infinity, for every u ; 
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(4 IWNW--I < 14; 
(d) W,,(U) = - wN( -u). 
To prove that the mechanism is asymptotically successful it suffices to show 
that 
Pr [i 2 Vi2 0 and 2 wN(ui) 5 1 0 1 (12) 
goes to zero as N approaches co. 
As a result, the probability of taking a non-optimal decision approaches zero 
with increasing N. 
Theorem. Under the hypotheses above, the probability that the mechanism 
will take the correct decision approaches one as the number of agents goes to 
infinity. 
ProojI Note first that (12) is equivalent to 
fl wN(vi) 
IN 50 -+O whenN+co. 
I 
(13) 
Denote : 
vi 
Bi, = -, 
dV’N 
N 
fiN = c UiN, 
i-l 
wN(vi) 
G’iN = w, 
wN _ = il ‘IN, 
Let y = [v’, v2] be the vector of jointly normally distributed random variables 
with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix 
CT2 CT2 
[ 1 02 a2 * 
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According to the theorem of Varadarajan [see Rao (1965)] it suffices to show 
that for all (I,, A,) E R x R, 
&0,+&O, + &y’+l,y2, 
in order to conclude that 
That is, I,& + I,$, approaches a univariate normal with zero mean and variance 
(A, +2,)%& 
Let 
% = AlaiN + 22GiNp 
and let Fi;iR be the distribution of aiN. Finally, let 
We will apply the Lindeberg-Feller central limit theorem [see Malinvaud 
(1969)] to conclude that aN converges to a normal distribution for every choice 
of 1, and 1,) and that the variance of this distribution is the same as that of the 
random variable ;l,~‘+;1~y~, namely, (A, +12)2a2. 
Let 
c-& = lim var aN. 
N 
The Lindeberg-Feller theorem says that if 
0; > 0, 
and, for all 2 > 0, 
(14) 
iiIst,,.da’dFiN -0, asN+co, (15) 
then uN approaches a normal random variable with mean zero and variance o”, . 
First we verify (14), proving in particular that o”, = (A, +12)2o2 > 0. Then 
we verify (15). By the remarks above this will complete the proof of the theorem. 
Let WN(Ui)-Ui = eN(ai). Note that, by (d) and symmetry of the distribution 
of Ui, IZeN = 0. Thus 
aiN = 
i [(I,+i12)02+2;12(~1+12)EuieN(ui)+~gEeN(ui)2] . 
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But 
since the vi are identically distributed, 
with I!PN(uJ~ < V?f(Vi) by (c) and 
for each Ui by (b). 
Hence, by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, 
iv 
Eu,e,(u,) + 0. 
Similarly, 
hence, 
To prove that (15) holds, take E > 0 and consider 
where 
A, = {Uil [(Ai +A&i+Ape,(uJl > Cl/N}. 
Since the vi are identically distributed, these integrals are independent of i. 
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The following inequalities show that when multiplied by N they are each still con- 
verging to zero. Hence the sum will go to zero as required by (15). Now, 
I;1,Ui+~2WN(Ui)12 ~ nqu:+l~W~(vi)‘+2~1;12IZ)iWN(Ui)l ~ (~1+212)2Vz 
by (c). 
Hence, 
s u2 dFiN < (~1’~2)2 ~ S pi” dF(vi) . AN AN 
Since J v: dF(vi) is finite, it suffices to show that n;= r AN = (0) in order that 
JAN z$ dF(‘(vi) will be made arbitrarily small with N. But ]AIv+i2w,(v)] 5 [AI + 
2A2]]vj, and thus for every v, there exists N, such that 
Lid/N 
I4 I -- , 1, + 21, 
foranyN2 N,. 
Thus niT’_ I AN = (0) and for any E > 0, there exists N such that 
or 
This verifies (15). 
Hence yN converges in distribution to y and hence, for N sufficiently large, 
]Pr[6, 2 0 and CN 5 O]-Pr[y’ >< 0 andy2 5 O]] < E. 
Since 
Pr[yr 2 0 and y2 5 0] = 0, 
we have the desired result of asymptotic successfulness of the mechanism. 
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